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Crafty Entanglements: Knitting and Hard Distinctions in
Aesthetics and Political Theory
  Kate M. Daley 
Abstract
Many theoretical writings on aesthetics and politics rely on
hard distinctions between what is and is not art, and what is
and is not political.  In this article, I draw on the work of
theorists, knitters, and fiber artists to argue that hand knitting
provides a lens through which to unsettle some of these
distinctions.  I illustrate some of the ways in which aesthetic
theory relies on hard distinctions between art and not-art and
politics and not-politics, with particular focus on the work of
Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, and Rancière.  I explain how knitting
is often seen as falling clearly outside the definitions of art and
politics, and explore the surprising ways in which knitting
shows the instability of these categories and expectations.  I
show that common social traditions and practices that often go
unanalyzed can provide insight into the limitations and
complexities of prevalent theoretical assumptions.
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1. Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger on art and not-art
There is no shortage of discussion about what constitutes art.
 Distinctions between what is and is not art, or beauty, have a
long history in continental aesthetic theory, stretching back to
Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Martin
Heidegger.  For Kant, beauty is evaluated through taste, which
depends on disinterest.  Interest, for Kant, is “[t]he delight
which we connect with imagining the real existence of any
object,” and is thus connected to desire.[1]  Kant claims that
“the agreeable,” which is pleasing to the senses[2] and “the
good,” which relies on having “a concept of” the thing,[3] are
both tied up with interest.  Kant believes that to be able to
judge the beautiful “[o]ne must not be in the least
prepossessed in favor of the real existence of the thing, but
must preserve complete indifference in this respect.”[4]  “The
beautiful,” Kant maintains, “is that which, apart from concepts,
is represented as the object of a UNIVERSAL  delight.”[5]  For
Kant, then, the assessment of beauty must be disconnected
from one’s own interest in the thing itself.  This seems to be
an attempt to disconnect notions of beauty, including in art,
from the more practical material relations of life.
Hegel’s work seems to also rely heavily on such distinctions;
for him they play the role of a starting premise.  In his case,
however, the split is not between beauty and interest, but
rather between fine art, which is his subject, and that which is
not fine art.  Hegel restricts his focus in the Introductory
Lectures on Aesthetics to “Fine Art.”[6]  He excludes nature
from his inquiry, as, from his perspective, “[m]ind, and mind
only, is capable of truth.”[7]  “Fine art is not real art,” Hegel
says, “till it is ... free, and only achieves its highest task when
it has taken its place in the same sphere with religion and
philosophy, and has become simply a mode of revealing to
consciousness and bringing to utterance Divine Nature, the
deepest interests of humanity, and the most comprehensive
truths of the mind.”[8]  He states:
Art liberates the real import of appearances from
the semblance and deception of this bad and
fleeting world, and imparts to phenomenal
semblances a higher reality, born of mind.  The
appearances of art, therefore, far from being
mere semblances, have the higher reality and the
more genuine existence in comparison with the
realities of common life.[9]
So, for Hegel, there is a stark line between fine art and both
nature and common life.  Despite being concerned with a
different distinction, Hegel’s insistence on a particular type of
art has a similar effect to that of Kant, insofar as it
emphasizes art as something higher than that which is not art.
While Kant and Hegel keep their distinctions between beauty
and interest or art and not-art fairly abstract, Heidegger’s
separations are perhaps best shown through his extensive use
of an example:  the famous painting of peasant shoes by
Vincent van Gogh.  In The Origin of the Work of Art,[10]
Heidegger explains that “as long as we only imagine a pair of
shoes in general, or merely look at the shoes as they stand
there in the picture, empty and unused, we will never learn
what the equipmental being of equipment in truth is.”[11]
 However, he goes on to revise this, saying of the painting,
“From out of the dark opening of the well-worn insides of the
shoes the toil of the worker’s tread stares forth.”[12]
 Heidegger believes “the equipmental being of the equipment”
is “its reliability,”[13] and that
The equipmental being of equipment was
discovered.... Not through the description and the
explanation of a pair of shoes actually present.
 Not through a report on the process of
shoemaking.  And not through the observation of
the actual use of shoes as it occurs here and
there.  Rather, the equipmental being of
equipment was only discovered by bringing
ourselves before the van Gogh painting.  It is this
that spoke. In proximity to the work we were
suddenly somewhere other than we are usually
accustomed to be.  The artwork let us know what
the shoes, in truth, are.[14]
Truth is closely connected with Heidegger’s definition of art. He
says that “[t]he essential nature of art would then be this:  the
setting-itself-to-work of the truth of beings.”[15]  Heidegger
is explicit that art is not about beauty, as is often said.[16]
 The work of art, for Heidegger, is the “disclosure of the being
as what and how it is.”[17]  This is “a happening of the truth
at work.”[18]  Importantly, for my purposes, Heidegger
explicitly states that “perhaps it is only in the picture that we
notice all this about the shoes,” as “[t]he peasant woman ...
merely wears them.”[19]
Thus Heidegger explicitly separates the work of art as a
revealer of the “truth of beings” from the beings
themselves,[20] and so seems to separate the particular from
the realm of truth.  Our concern, for Heidegger, is not the
particular shoes or the particular woman who wears them but
rather the truth of being of the shoes as equipment.  This is
closely connected to the removal of interest from definitions of
the beautiful for Kant, and the removal of lower forms from
high art for Hegel.  In all three theories, art is seen to provide
access to truth or objectivity in a way that other forms of
knowledge creation do not.
2.  Rancière on politics and dissensus
As much as distinctions between what is and is not art have
been a foundational theme for significant aesthetic thinkers,
distinctions between what is and is not politics are just as
significant within political thought, and within general Western
social discourse separating the public from the private or
domestic.  Among theorists whose writing focuses significantly
on both aesthetics and politics, Jacques Rancière exemplifies
this split.  He defines politics in a very particular way.
 “Politics,” for Rancière, “stands (sic) in distinct opposition to
the police.”[21]  For him, “the police is (sic) not a social
function but a symbolic constitution of the social,” and
“consists ... in recalling the obviousness of what there is, or
rather of what there is not, and its (sic) slogan is: ‘Move along!
 There’s nothing to see here!’”[22]  Politics, in contrast to the
police, “consists in transforming this space of ‘moving-along,’
of circulation, into a space for the appearance of a subject:
 the people, the workers, the citizens.”[23]  Politics, then, “is
an intervention in the visible and the sayable.”[24]
Central to Rancière’s split between politics and the police is his
distinction between two other concepts, namely dissensus and
consensus.  For Rancière, “[t]he essence of politics is
dissensus,” which “is not a confrontation between interests or
opinions” but rather “the demonstration ... of a gap in the
sensible itself.”[25]  Consensus, then, “lies in the annulment of
dissensus as separation of the sensible from itself,” and “in the
reduction of politics to the police.”[26] “Consensus is,”
therefore, “the ‘end of politics’:  in other words, not the
accomplishment of the ends of politics but simply a return to
the normal state of things – the non-existence of politics.”[27]
 It is clear, then, that conceptual thinking about politics, for
Ranciere, is heavily bound up in his distinctions between
politics and the police, and between dissensus and consensus.
3. The entangled knitter
In light of the above, knitting would seem to fall into
categories of both not-art and not-politics.  Before I go on to
define knitting, however, I must provide a brief disclaimer.  I
can go no farther without a word on my own entanglements. I
am a knitter.  Knitting is an integral part of how I see myself
in relation to my material and cultural surroundings.  I am also
connected in my life to politics in a broad sense, though it is
debatable whether or not my own endeavors fit into politics as
Rancière defines it.  I could choose to go on, in the style
popular in much of academia, and pretend that I am not
entangled.  This would be, at best, disingenuous, and at worst,
a rejection in practice of the arguments I make here in theory.
 This article is, among other things, a defense of
entanglement, and a rejection of the inclination in much of
aesthetic and political theory to write as though there can be a
clear line between these categories.  I therefore use some of
my own examples and experiences, while relying on the work
and experiences of many others, in the web of knitting, art,
and politics that follows.
Knitting can be defined, as Joanne Turney suggests, as
“formation of a fabric consisting of vertical columns through
the looping of a continuous yarn.”[28]  Hand knitting, in
contrast with that often done today by machine, involves “two
or more needles” that are used to make the loops.[29]
Knitting, as Turney notes, is often socially associated with
women, due to its status as “largely a domestic pursuit” that
is “associated with the home.”[30]  She also argues that
knitting has significant ties to Romanticism, saying that
knitting has “come to characterize a Romantic nostalgia ... and
in some cases a rejection of the contemporary and a desire to
‘revive’ that which is near death.”[31]
4.  Knitting as not-art and not-politics?
Given these views of knitting, which have recently been
culturally prevalent in contemporary Western conceptions of
knitting, it is not hard, in the context of the authors discussed
above, to see knitting as not-art.  It does not perform well
within the binary hierarchies set forth by Kant, Hegel, and
Heidegger.  Knitting is interested, in Kant’s sense in which we
are concerned about the real existence of the thing, and for
Kant this is mutually exclusive with taste. Knitting is mostly
seen to produce functional items that are worn for practical
purposes.  It can be hard to imagine knitting that does not
have as its aim an item in which one would be interested, in
Kant’s sense.
For these reasons, it is also difficult to see knitting as Fine Art,
in Hegel’s usage.  The production of practical articles, even if
visually pleasing, is seen to be part of the “realities of common
life” rather than the “higher reality” with which Hegel identifies
fine art.[32]  Turney herself indicates that knitting was often
seen in the twentieth century to be part of a way of being
“thrifty” and “saving money” in the home,[33] which is hardly
a pursuit on a par with philosophy or religion in Hegel’s
framework.
Perhaps most compelling for the separation between knitting
and art, however, is Heidegger’s analysis of the peasant shoes.
 Knit garments, like peasant shoes, are functional necessities
at various points in history, and often are to this day.  Both are
functionally focused, which Heidegger assumes means that
they do not reveal their true being by themselves, but rather
can only have their being revealed as truth through art.
Beyond the distinctions of  these three thinkers, general
sensibilities about art also seem to be missing in knitting.
Knitting can be seen as lacking creativity and uniqueness. 
Stephanie Pearl-McPhee, a knitting humor writer, writes about
a trip to the woods in which she was struggling with thinking
about knitting as a creative activity.[34]  “When you are
creative,” she says, “you’re relying on your own brain to come
up with answers, solutions, and concepts.... [N]ot all knitting is
creative, using the traditional definition.”[35]  “We creatively
problem solve in knitting all the time,” she says, “but the act
itself, actual knitting, that’s not tremendously creative,” but
rather, “[t]hat’s execution.”[36]  In this sense, the act of
knitting can be seen as mostly following directions written to
achieve a product envisioned and designed by another.
 Creativity may not play much of a part.
Knitting can also easily be seen as lacking the uniqueness
ordinarily associated with art.  Who made art is typically seen
as important, while following a pattern to produce a particular
object can be seen as repeating the work of others.  This
perception is reinforced by the extensive presence of
industrially produced knit objects.  Pearl-McPhee notes that
the “commercial knitting industry” produces “just about
everything stretchy,” and people wear knit fabrics of various
sorts each day.[37]  The preponderance of industrially knit
items and the extensive use of patterns support the notion
that knitting is not unique enough to be art.  Thus,  thinkers
like Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger as well as  the general public
are generally unlikely to see knitting as art.
Similarly, Rancière and the general public are unlikely to see
knitting as politics.  Knitting can be seen to fit well into
Rancière’s understanding of consensus.  Knitting is often seen
as a trope.  As Turney says, “on the surface, knitting is
ostensibly an ordinary activity associated with the domestic
sphere.”[38]  In fact, knitting has such strong stereotypes
associated with it that Turney notes it is used by Agatha
Christie’s character Miss Marple so that she can “disappear into
the background” while investigating.[39]  “Knitting is
understood,” Turney goes on to say, “as an innocuous activity,
associated with dithering – if not curious – old ladies.”[40]  In
this way, knitting fits neatly into the sensible and the sayable
within Rancière’s frame, and does not create an opening.  In
Turney’s words, “The iconography and meanings attributed to
knitting infer that it expresses a non-changing activity and
aesthetic, a general and popularly held view of craft per se:
 stability and continuity.”[41]
These expectations are so strong that knitting can be
overlooked even by feminists.  Ann Wilson describes her
experiences at the University of Guelph.[42]  She noticed that
some people applying for jobs in the Fine Art and Music
department “had, either as a primary or secondary interest,
art practices that involved craft,” and particularly knitting.[43]
 She told a graduate student about her observation, with
“bemused incredulity with just a hint of condescension.”[44]
 In response, she was told by the graduate student, “All the
women in the Ph.D. program knit.”[45]  The perception of
knitting as a domestic, feminine pursuit often gives the
impression that knitting cannot possibly be a form of politics,
in the broader sense beyond Rancière’s definition, even among
those who, as feminists, are theoretically inclined to examine
these gendered distinctions.
5.  The instability of art
Despite these tropes and because of them, knitting can and
does unsettle definitions of both art and politics.  Knitting can
be seen to unsettle definitions of art in two different forms:
 knitting as a knit product that is produced, and knitting as a
process that is undertaken.
Knitting as product shows that the distinction between art and
functionality is not stable.  Some knitting is seen as not
functional and classified as art, but this is not definitive, and
knitting shows that the functional cannot and should not be
excluded from art.  Despite the stereotypes, there is knitting
today that is not designed to be functional.  This is part of
Heidegger’s complaint:  the functional blends into daily life,
and this blocks our ability to see the truth of its being. Today,
hand-knit objects have become somewhat more distanced
from the functional.  As Turney notes, “hand knitting is now a
hobby rather than a necessity and as such is an indulgence,
distanced from the world of domestic chores.”[46]
This distance from the functional can be seen in examples
from various knitters, some of which are explicitly classified as
art.  Anna Hrachovec produces incredible, and often tiny, knit
projects that do not have a functional purpose.  One can view
photos on her website[47] of art installation projects that
encompass  all kinds of knit creatures, including gnomes,
snowmen, and mountains and rainbows with eyes. In another
vein, KNIT CamBRIDGE was a project of Sue Sturdy,  the 2010
Artist in Residence for the City of Cambridge in Ontario,
Canada, and was a successful effort to cover the city’s iconic
Main Street Bridge  with knitting.[48] Many knitters from
many places, including myself, contributed knitting to the
project (Figure 1).  Thus, though much knitting is functional,
not all knitting is functional, particularly today, and knitting is
at times classified as art.
 
Figure 1:  The 2010 KNIT CamBRIDGE installation in
Cambridge, Ontario, Canada.  Photo by the author.
Even in these projects, however, knitting is not separated from
function.  KNIT CamBRIDGE was intentionally connected to the
history of industrial textile production in Cambridge.[49]  Anna
Hrachovec has two websites for her work:  one for her fiber art
exhibitions, and one for her knit patterns and knitting
books.[50]  Both of Hrachovec’s websites contain many of the
same little characters and themes, though popular expectation
means that having two websites (to distinguish the practical
from the artistic) is likely professionally advantageous.  The
lines between art and craft are clearly blurred by the overlap.
Knitting as a product shows that the functional cannot be
separated from art, and does not need to be.  This is part of
Heidegger’s mistake.  He advocates for the work of art
because he believes that it, and not everyday items, allows us
to get to the truth of being.  In reality, though, art, as distinct
from the practical, is not required for us to ask interesting and
important questions about peasant shoes. Ann Wilson’s
conversation with a graduate student was enough for her to
reflect on the practice of knitting in a sufficiently serious
fashion for her to write a chapter about it. Heidegger might
respond, quite rightly, that this was a conversation that was
not provoked by actual knitting. Nonetheless, knit items
themselves can be approached with a curiosity that can lead
to such discussions and examinations.  For example, on a
website called Ravelry,[51] which I and others often describe
as “like Facebook for knitters,” one can find a number of
knitting patterns for baby cocoons.  These are stretchy little
knit sacks, and the photos often show them enveloping real
babies.  These baby cocoons, one learns, are often used as
props for baby photo shoots.  I can imagine that one could
learn quite a lot from taking a moment to ask oneself some
questions about these cocoons, and perhaps by asking them of
 the cocoon’s owner, the person who knit it, or the person who
designed the pattern.
If we consider these cocoons to be roughly analogous, for my
purposes, to Heidegger’s peasant shores, it is perhaps easier
to see the limitations of his analysis.  Heidegger’s mistake is in
part that he sees the painting of the peasant shoes as an
exposure of truth rather than as a particular type of mediated
conversation about the shoes.  A differently mediated but no
less useful conversation could be had by asking the peasant
woman about the items that she knows so well, just as one
can learn from speaking to a parent who puts a  child in a
cocoon.  Even more could be learned and said by discussing
the items with a cobbler, knitting designer or knitter, or by
speaking with someone who paints peasant shoes or takes
photos of babies in cocoons.  It is debatable whether
Heidegger’s ideas regarding the truth of being can be revealed
in this way, but important questions about truth, life, and
social meaning certainly can, and should be explored in this
way.
The question of the baby cocoons, however, shows more than
the limitations of Heidegger’s framework.  It shows the futility
of trying to definitively separate art from non-art.  Are such
cocoons art?  One might say no, since they can be reproduced
using a simple pattern, and thus have more in common with
industrial clothing production.  However, can they be
considered art when they are used in commercial baby
photography?  What if the photography is not commercial, but
rather destined for an art gallery?  Should the photos be
classified as art, but not the cocoons themselves?  What if the
cocoons are created and tweaked for this purpose?  These
questions and the many more that could be asked suggest
that, even in more social and less theoretical notions of art,
the lines are not clear.  Art and not-art cannot be definitively
separated, and since we can ask good questions about
functional items that are right in front of us, they do not need
to be.
Knitting as a product, then, suggests that the definition of art
is much less stable than some of the thinkers cited above
might suggest.  The same is true for knitting as a process. The
actual process of knitting can show the instability of the
category of art, particularly in relation to the issues of
creativity and performance.
First, on the issue of creativity, Pearl-McPhee eventually chose
to reframe her discussion and her interpretation.  She realized
that “[k]nitting wasn’t always about creativity, and neither was
writing; it was about creation, bringing something into
being.”[52]  While it can certainly be argued that many
aspects of knitting as a process are, in fact, creative, seeing
knitting through the lens of creation can bring new affinities
with art in general, as art can be seen to depend on creation
as much as on creativity.  Where exactly could one say that
creation stops and creativity starts?  This slippage between
creativity and creation shows the futility of trying to separate
art from not-art on the basis of creativity.
Second, and perhaps more substantially, knitting as a process
can be seen to unsettle definitions of art through its role as a
performance, which can straddle the practical and the artistic.
 This is closely related to Jacques Lacan’s work on the gaze.
 Part of the gaze is Lacan’s suggestion that who we are is
heavily interrelated with how we are “beings who are looked
at.”[53]  The gaze precedes the eye for Lacan.[54]  “The gaze
I encounter,” he says, “is, not a seen gaze, but a gaze
imagined by me in the field of the other.”[55]  He speaks of
Sartre, who was overwhelmed by the gaze and shamed by it
while “looking through a keyhole.”[56]  “What determines
me,” Lacan says, “at the most profound level, in the visible, is
the gaze that is outside.”[57]
In explaining the gaze, Lacan uses Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
analysis of Choang-tsu, who is said to have dreamed he was a
butterfly, but when he woke, he wondered whether he was
really a butterfly dreaming that he was Choang-tsu.[58] Lacan
says “in the dream, he is a butterfly for nobody.  It is when he
is awake that he is Choang-tsu for others, and is caught in
their butterfly net.”[59]  Unlike animals, though, and crucially
for the issue of performance as art, Lacan believes a human
“knows how to play with the mask as that beyond which there
is the gaze.”[60]  Humans are not “entirely caught up in this
imaginary capture.”[61]
The gaze as part of performance plays an important role in
knitting as a process.  We are seen to knit, or rather, we see
ourselves as people who are seen to knit.  Is knitting a “trap
for the gaze,” as Lacan calls it?[62]  For Lacan, this means
that the person in question “wishes to be looked at.”[63] This
is certainly sometimes the case with knitting.  While I often
knit in public settings, I on some level do this to keep my
hands busy.  That is not to say, however, that I do not get
enjoyment from other people taking interest in my activity in
various ways, and that I am not fully aware that I am being
watched while I knit; further, I do not object to being watched
while I knit.  More formally, some knitters use being seen to
knit for more specific purposes, such as a recent “knit-in” in
support of striking Toronto Public Library workers that brought
out more than 100 people.[64]
Turney notes that “knitting is so firmly established within
popular culture through its iconology and iconography, it is an
ideal genre to exploit, manipulate and challenge.”[65] 
Knitting is largely a trope, and alternate stories can be told
about the awareness of being watched.  Unless one knits
alone, one is knitting in the gaze.  That is, one knits with
awareness that others see one knitting, and this can be used
intentionally for exploitation and challenge.  I would also argue
that one knitting alone is subject to the same gaze, since we
are “beings who are looked at, in the spectacle of the
world.”[66]  It may well be that many of us knit, in part,
because we come to see ourselves as people who are seen to
knit, and that shapes how we understand ourselves to be
perceived in the world.
So while knitting involves performance, does this mean that
knitting can be seen as performance art?  Paul Virilio can help
with this question.  He believes that all current art is a
performance. He says, “In my opinion, all art today is a
spectacle.”[67]  Contemporary art, for Virilio, is
of the moment.  But it can only disappear in the
shrinking of instantaneity, because the instant is
constantly being reduced.  We know it all too
well:  from microseconds now we’ve reached
nanoseconds.  So, in some way, the instant is
what does not last, what disappears.[68]
For Virilio, then, performance is connected with his concept of
speed, which he states “pits contemporary civilization against
those that have preceded it.”[69]  “Speed suppresses not only
Relatedness ... but also Reason.”[70] The result of speed,
then, is that “we must now eliminate what still subsists of
material opposition to advancement, to the dromospheric race
of automotive devices.”[71]
Where does knitting fit into this narrative of performance and
speed?  The act of knitting can be seen as a performance that
is in the moment and that disappears in an instant.  It can be
used for intentionally momentary artistic endeavors.  It can,
however, also be seen as a challenge to speed.  In her
analysis of non-knitter responses to the fact that knitting a
pair of socks takes her fourteen to twenty hours, Pearl-
McPhee invokes the value of time and investment of effort that
keeps us from serving boxed macaroni to guests or berating
Michelangelo for spending so long on the Sistine Chapel.[72]
 Watching someone knit can be a visible reminder that there
are things more valuable than efficiency, and this can appear
even in places that are significantly focused on quick
outcomes, such as on public transit.  Knitting as a public
performance or as a personal performance may be a cue to
challenge the devolution to speed that so worries Virilio, even
while such performance participates in speed as something
instantaneous.
Knitting as a performance can also be tied to disrupting the
stereotypes and tropes associated with it, in an era that is
often viewed as postmodern.  Turney notes that, within
contexts of postmodernism as “a movement in the visual and
material arts, ... the cultural knowledge the viewer brings to
the work in terms of its interpretation is as important, if not
more so, than the person who created it.”[73]  Despite
knitting’s links with Romanticism, Turney argues that “the
handmade object ... can – and frequently does – demonstrate
aspects of postmodernism, which challenges the perception of
the craft object as a stable entity.”[74]  She argues that
“[t]raditional disciplinary boundaries that delineate art, craft,
design, and fashion are now less stable, with disciplines
crossing, fusing, and borrowing from one another.”[75]
 Through disruption of these boundaries, these active attempts
can certainly be seen to have the philosophical weight that
Hegel looks for in his definition of art, but this weight also
depends on the tropes of the domestic themselves. In toying
with these barriers, knitting as a process can unsettle
distinctions between what is and what is not art.
6. The instability of politics
So knitting both as a product and as a process can be seen to
show the instability of the category of art.  It can, however,
also show the instability of the category of politics.  Knitting
unsettles hard distinctions about politics because it can be
used to undermine the binaries that have supported those
distinctions, because it can be used in overtly political ways
despite and because of its domestic connotations, and because
it can be seen as both consensus and dissensus.
First, knitting can be used to undermine the binaries that have
supported hard distinctions between the political and the
apolitical.  It has been a symbol used to reinforce images of
the domestic.  Knitting in the West has existed in a cultural
context that values some things as masculine and public, and
devalues things that are seen as their opposites. In ideas now
common in the North American feminist tradition, the
discrediting of knitting as part of the private is connected to a
devaluing of interpersonal care and the domestic, which is tied
to the devaluing of women who are socially expected to
perform domestic tasks and to sacrifice themselves in the
process.  This devaluing and gendered self-sacrifice can be
and is challenged by knitters in their daily lives.  Wilson notes
that “[k]nitting, for these women [in the graduate program],
represents a reclamation of a craft in which women have
excelled, allowing the graduate students who participate in the
culture of ‘stitch ’n bitch’ to take the time to attend to
themselves and regroup in an activity that relaxes them.”[76]
 She also notes that she wonders “if knitting among third-
wave feminists in the academy carries a bit of refusal to
capitulate to [her] generation’s over-investment in work,”
which had been a necessary generational reaction to the
exclusion of women from the academy.[77]  As such, knitting
can be part of a resistance at a personal level to various
expectations shaped in sexist power relations.  Those relations
have shaped the terms of the political and apolitical, just as
they have shaped the domestic placement of knitting within
gendered terms.
Second, knitting can show the instability of the category of
politics by taking this resistance and inserting the domestic
into matters that are generally seen as part of the
conventional realm of politics.  This can only be done in spite
of, and because of, knitting’s strong domestic connotations.
For example, there is a campaign in the United States for
people to knit uteruses and send them to congressmen with
the theme:  “Dear Men in Congress:  If we knit you a uterus,
will you stay out of ours?”[78]  This has been in response to
significant efforts in the United States to dramatically reduce
access to reproductive choice, which NARAL Pro-Choice
America calls “The War on Women.”[79]  I myself decided to
create a uterus (Figure 2) for a Member of Parliament who was
trying to bring debate of access to abortion back into our
House of Commons through a motion to re-examine the
definition of “human being” in the Criminal Code of
Canada,[80] and I created a video about it.[81]  Other overtly
political knitting projects have involved sending knit helmet
liners to members of the United States Senate, or covering a
military tank with pink knitting.[82]  These activities are often
seen as political in the public realm because they expressly
address the supposedly proper realm of politics, namely state
legislation and power.  They do so, however, by inserting
something that is generally excluded from the supposedly
public political realm.  This insertion gently mocks that
delineation and works to undermine those who would have us
believe that politics can and should be firmly separated from
the domestic.
 
Figure 2:  Uterus knit by the author and sent to a
Member of 
Parliament in Canada. 
Pattern by M. K. Carroll.[83]  Photo by the author.
Third, knitting shows the instability of the concept of politics
by being both consensus and dissensus in Rancière’s
framework.  If politics for him is “an intervention in the visible
and the sayable,”[84] then knitting should not be it.  As noted
above, we see knit garments all the time, and the production
of clothing can be seen as a mundane hobby or something
that simply appears to blend into the background. This does
not sound like dissensus.  However, knitting is less common
now than it was, and is increasingly done by young women
and men.  The confusion and mixed reactions to knitting in
public that Pearl-McPhee notes[85] are not uncommon in my
own experiences.  Much of the time, knitting no longer fades
into the background.
Knitting that is not intended for explicitly functional purposes,
in particular, often contains dissensus, given our current
symbolic order.  Whether covering a bridge with knitting[86]
or creating a miniature world in which snowmen and gnomes
are fighting each other,[87] knitting can create gaps in the
sayable or the symbolic order.  When I was working on a panel
for KNIT CamBRIDGE, I had difficulty explaining to people
what the project was, in large part because of the gap
between supposedly domestic, soft, and non-functional
knitting and the overt functionality and hardness of the surface
it was to cover.  Many of the people with whom I spoke could
not picture such a bridge and could not figure out how to
speak of it.
This, however, is somewhat subjective, which leads to a
significant problem that knitting uncovers in Rancière’s
opposition of dissensus and consensus.  Dissensus and
consensus, it seems, can be seen quite differently by different
people.  I was once knitting a vest at a municipal council
meeting on a local issue that had become contentious, and I
was paying close attention to the proceedings.  I was
surprised when three different participants told me, separately,
that I reminded them of Madame Defarge from A Tale of Two
Cities.  Defarge was, as Turney explains, a character who was
part of the Reign of Terror after the French Revolution, and
who “quietly and vengefully knits the names of the
Revolution’s intended victims into a list.”[88]  Turney sees
Defarge as “both part of, and seemingly oblivious to, the
hatred both within and around her.”[89]  In my case, the
image of the intense, judgemental participant/spectator was
not one that I was trying to convey, but the image of me
knitting had particular meaning for a number of the other
actors in the space that each of us contributed to shaping.  My
participation in the sayable and unsayable, then, was
significantly different for me than for others around me.  I was
participating in and disrupting a symbolic order of which I was
not even aware, and creating new combinations of the sayable
in the process.  I was creating different moments of dissensus,
which resolved into different new moments of consensus. My
aim was to finish the vest before my little nephew’s birthday.
 For consensus and dissensus, it is hard to deny that
perspective matters a great deal.
Given Rancière’s reliance on consensus and dissensus for his
notion of politics, where does that leave politics and knitting
for Rancière?  He would likely consider the knit uterus project
to be a matter of “[p]olitical demonstration,” which
makes visible that which has no reason to be
seen; it places one world in another – for
instance, the world where the factory is a public
space in that where it is considered private, the
world where workers speak, and speak about the
community, in that where their voices are mere
cries expressing pain.[90]
For him, however, political demonstration does not fall under
the definition of politics because it “presupposes partners that
are already preconstituted as such and discursive forms that
entail a speech community, the constraint of which is always
explicable.”[91]  If “[p]olitics can therefore be defined ... as
the activity that breaks with the order of the police by
inventing new subjects,”[92] then is knitting politics?  The
answer is both yes and no.  Rancière sees politics as
constitutive of subjects, and knitters are constituted through
the act of knitting, albeit more or less conservatively or
disruptively depending on the particulars.  If we take Lacan’s
use of the gaze seriously and consider all hand knitting as a
performance, we cannot help but see knitting as constitutive of
subjects, in particular times and places.
The problem, of course, is that subjects are always constituted
in these sorts of moments.  This makes Rancière’s distinction
not much of a distinction at all.  A close examination of
knitting leads us to wonder whether the split between politics
and not-politics can ever be taken as a premise upon which
theory could build.
7. Conclusion:  distinctions as lenses
Theories of art and politics, in both formal theory and popular
discourse, often rely on what are seen to be hard distinctions
that isolate art and politics from what they are not.  Knitting,
as both a product and a process, can show the instability of
the categories of art and politics in a variety of ways.
Perhaps what knitting shows, then, is that splits between
politics/not-politics, consensus/dissensus, and art/not-art
should not be used as starting points to theory.  Perhaps they
rather should be used as possible lenses through which to view
and understand particular moments.  In this framework,
knitting a uterus, or a sweater, can be seen to be
simultaneously both political and apolitical in ways that are
always shifting.  Then the boundaries between art and not-art
and politics and not-politics can be recognized as unstable,
while still allowing us to see the importance of those meanings
in contemporary life, art, and politics.[93]
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